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Abstract 
 
In the capital’s 1955 election, Masyumi established itself a place among the 
winning parties with 167,707 votes, surpassing their biggest rivals PNI, PKI, and 
NU in parliamentary votes. Nevertheless, it was not an easy victory. This study 
questions on why Masyumi was able to win the capital’s 1955 election and made 
PNI failed to gain the upper hand in Jakarta, despite the region being politically 
heterogeneous and thus theoretically an easy territory to conquer by the 
nationalists. By using the historical method, this study answers the above 
questions. The result of this study is a fact that the race between Masyumi and PNI 
to gain votes was one of a riveting story. As the centre of power where major 
political, social, and economic activities were conducted, the political constellation 
in Jakarta was comparatively more dynamic to regions outside the capital. Hence, 
Masyumi’s triumph over the other major parties holds some historical 
significance. The fact that Masyumi triumphed over PNI (who were the winner on 
a national level) deserves a study unto itself, through which we can analyze 
Jakarta’s political composition at the time, the political strategies employed by 
competing parties, voters’ attitude, people’s political participation and 
furthermore, Masyumi’s campaign strategies. 
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Introduction 
The 1955 general election is the first general election ever held in Indonesia. The first 
legislative phase to elect members of parliament was held on 29 September 1955, while 
the second phase, held on 15 December 1955, elected members of the Constitutional 
Assembly. The election turned out to be a vibrant, tightly-contested one due to 
Indonesia’s multi-party political climate of the time (Budihardjo. The result saw four 
parties emerging as winners of the election: the Indonesian National Party (PNI), the 
Council of Indonesian Muslim Association (Masyumi), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and 
the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). 
Masyumi’s rise in Indonesian politics can be traced back from the early 
Parliamentary Democracy era, where M. Natsir, an influential Masyumi cadre, was 
appointed as the fifth prime minister. Internal dispute over party’s political orientation 
raged when the cabinet under Natsir proposed a bill for a general election, which some 
people argued as contradictive to the party’s end goal to establish an Islamic state. The 
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move itself was also considered unconstitutional, since no articles in the constitution 
mention general election as a procedure for appointing representatives and leaders. 
From a historical perspective, the 1955 general election was held in a time which 
Ricklefs termed as “the democratic experiment”: a phase where Indonesia was 
constantly on the search for forms of government and political systems to best suit the 
domestic situation (Ricklefs, 2008, p. 28); a time that most people now see as the most 
dynamic in the history of Indonesian democracy. While the election had served as an 
exercise in democracy, its ultimate goals were to constitute a parliament that 
accomodated all political spectrums, put an end to frequent cabinet crises, and create 
cohesion among political parties; in other words: political stability. Not only the first 
ever election taught valuable lessons in democracy, it has now also become a reference 
in how to set up an election for today’s historians, lawmakers and politicians (Todung, 
2007, p. 171). 
The idea for a nationwide election had been tossed around since it was first 
proposed in October 1945. A month later, the Government Edict of 3 November 1945 
about the establishment of political parties was issued as a preliminary step towards a 
national election (Poesponegoro & Notosusanto, 1984: 622; Sekretariat Negara, 1975: 
56). The proposal gained a legal foothold with the 1948 Election Act (Law No. 27/1948,) 
which were later amended with the 1949 Act (Law No. 12/1949).  
The 1949 Election Act stated that the election was to be held indirectly, a 
consideration based on the fact that the majority of Indonesians at the time were 
illiterate and it seemed that the proposal for a direct election had to be shelved for the 
time being. Nevertheless, the talk for a direct, nationwide election began for the second 
time as the new election draft became one of the priority programs under the Natsir 
Cabinet, which was constituted in the late 1950 (Feith, 1962). The planning were 
conducted by the Sahardjo Committee of the Kantor Panitia Pemilihan Pusat (Central 
Election Committee Office) and the results were brought to the parliament. As a side 
note, at that point Indonesia had returned to the unitary system, which replaced the 
1949 Republic of the United States of Indonesia. 
After the dissolution of the Natsir Cabinet just six months later, the talks for the 
election draft continued under the Sukiman Cabinet (also from Masyumi like his 
predecessor). This time the draft had become a constitutional necessity since the 
Article 57 of the 1950 Provisional Constitution ruled that members of the People’s 
Representative Council be elected through a direct election (Elson, 2013, p. 387). Just 
like the previous cabinet, Sukiman’s cabinet also failed to finalize the draft. The talks 
dragged on until 1953 when the draft was finalized into 1953 Election Act (Law No. 
7/1953) under the Wilopo cabinet, which served as the legal basis for the upcoming 
1955 election. Hence, the ‘indirect’ election act of 1948 an 1949 were no longer valid. 
The 1955 used as system called proportional electoral system. This system was 
proposed to eliminate the weakness of the district system. The proportional system 
dictated that the allocation of seats should adhere to a predetermined, and agreed 
upon, ratio. For example, since the ratio was determined as 1:400,000 for every region, 
it means that a seat in the Assembly would be allocated for every 400,000 votes. The 
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number of representatives from a given region was determined by dividing the total 
number of eligible voters by 400,000. For this purpose, the nation was divided into 
several electoral regions (comprised of several counties and cities), which was 
comparatively bigger than districts (Budihardjo, 1977: 177‒180). 
The preparation phase began during the First Ali Sastroamijoyo Cabinet (31 July 
1953‒12 August 1955). After the election act had been issued, Panitia Pemilihan 
Indonesia (Indonesian Election Committee) was formed and inaugurated on 28 
November 1953 through a presidential decree dated 7 November 1953, followed by a 
handover between Kantor Panitia Pemilihan Pusat and the newly formed PPI. S. 
Hadikusumo from PNI was appointed as PPI’s head, and members were handpicked 
from various political parties and organizations such as NU, PSII, PRI, PRN, Partai 
Buruh, BTI, Perti and Parkindo (Feith, 1962: 384). 
The PPI was tasked to: (1) form national and regional election committee, (2) 
determine the electoral regions. On 16 April 1955 it was decided that the parliamentary 
election would be held on 29 September 1955 and the Constitutional Assembly on 15 
December 1955. The campaign phase had officially begun (Feith, 1962: 46). However, 
several electoral regions declared themselves unable to hold the parliamentary 
election on the stipulated date due to several reasons. So the PPI gave a two months 
window for those regions to hold the parliamentary election on their own schedule, 
which were due on 29 November. These regions were Aceh Barat, Aceh Timur, Aceh 
Utara, Riau, Bengkalis, Batanghari, Sanggau, Kapuas Hulu, Barito, Kotawaringin, 
Kotabaru, Bulungan, Poso, Donggala, Manggarai, Maluku Utara, Maluku Tenggara, 
dan lain-lain (Ahmad, 2016: 53). 
Masyumi as a political party only lasted fifteen years, from 1945 to 1960. The 
party's 1945 constitution stated that Masyumi was to be the ‘one and only Indonesian 
Islamic political party’. Given that Islam was the religion of the great majority of 
Indonesians, it was only natural that Masyumi leaders expected the party to be a 
dominant force in future elections. Suffice it to say, they were off for a rough start.  
Right from the outset, Perti, a small faction of Sumatran traditionalists within 
Masyumi refused to join and established themselves as a rival party to Masyumi. 
Changes in Masyumi's leadership and organisational structure in 1949 alienated their 
NU bases and they eventually seceded in 1952 after being denied a seat in the Wilopo 
cabinet by the party board. NU became an independent party soon afterwards and 
formed the Indonesian Muslim League (Liga Muslimin Indonesia) with Perti and PSII 
as a rival group to Masyumi.  
In the proto-parliament (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat: KNIP) of 1946-1949, 
Masyumi was allocated 60 seats, but this was never delivered. Similarly, in the 
provisional parliament of 1950-55, of which the composition was determined by the 
consensus of political elite, Masyumi only got 2146 of seats despite being vitually the 
largest party. Indonesia's first general election in 1955 also failed to achieve their goal 
for a sweeping victory. (Fealy, 2005, 80) 
Since the early 1950s, Masyumi was often referred to in the context of a broader 
constituency known as the ‘Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang’. This included not only 
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Masyumi members but also members of affiliated or sympathetic organisations. This 
group was overwhelmingly modernist in their views and their key 'member 
organisations' were Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association), Al-
Irsyad, the Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement (GPII), the Indonesian (Tertiary) 
Students Association (HMI) and the Indonesian (Secondary) Students' Association 
(PII). Masyumi leaders and publications often referred to this ‘Bulan Bintang Family’ 
as if it was a cohesive group, but in reality it was an amorphous and shifting category 
(Suyoto & Redjeki, 2005) 
For the modernist Masyumi, mobilization was used as a mean to maximize votes, 
particularly around the issue of threat from the communists, secular nationalists and 
the West. Masyumi concentrated on presenting itself as the guardian of the Islamic 
faith against the Indonesian secular state. Interpretation of Islamic symbols was also 
undertaken, by adapting the story of the Prophet Muhammad for political purposes. 
For Muslim leaders, the electoral outcome represented a devastating defeat. It reversed 
their expectation that the Muslim majority would wish for a constitution based on 
Islamic laws in Indonesia. Another shocking development, especially for modernist 
Masyumi leadership, was the rise of PKI who emerged as one of the biggest parties. 
Masyumi’s failure was largely rooted in its inability to attract grassroot support from 
nominal Muslims (especially the abangan). The election also confirmed the secular-
religious cleavage in the electoral arena. That it divided the electorate down the middle 
signalled for a continuing ideological battles. This result was repeated with small 
variations in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly. 
The 1955 electoral outcomes revealed a clear division in the party choice of 
modernist and traditionalist Muslims. Partai NU’s dominance in Central and East Java 
as well as South Kalimantan illustrated the strong role of traditional ulama and its 
pesantren networks. The Partai NU was also satisfied at increasing its number of seats 
from 8 in the DPRS to 45 in the Parliament. In contrast, Masyumi gained a majority in 
the Outer Islands and West Java, where Muhammadiyah and other reformist-oriented 
organizations were most active (Munhanif, 2012, 24). 
Masyumi’s anti-communist propaganda centered around presenting what they 
considered to be the real face of communism. The party leaders unrelentingly called 
on people to return to the very sources of their political enemies’ doctrine. Natsir 
recalled Lenin’s teachings concerning the elimination of the Revolution’s opponents. 
In a speech made in Tandjung Priok in March 1954, Jusuf Wibisono referred to what 
he had experienced in a trip to Moscow, “the centre of communism”, which led him 
to the conclusion that a compromise between religion and communism was 
impossible. Masyumi’s leaders also warned their fellow countrymen about PKI’s 
proposal to replace the reference to a single God in Pancasila with a simple affirmation 
of a principle of religious freedom, which would be the first step in a programme 
aimed at establishing a “freedom of anti-religious propaganda” (Madinier, 2015, 148). 
Confrontations between the two parties sometimes went further than the usual 
polemics. From 1954, the Masyumi press regularly reported on violent clashes, and 
one of the most enlightening of these happened on 28 April 1954, at a PKI rally held in 
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Malang which was also attended by Masyumi supporters. In front of the rostrum from 
which the PKI’s first secretary made his speech, a banner was unrolled which read: 
“Woe upon the terrorist-bandits of the BKOOI and Masyumi.” According to the 
account given on D. N. Aidit’s speech in Abadi, he explained that the PKI was anti-
capitalist and anti-imperialist, and also refuted any accusations presenting him as anti-
religious.  
Masyumi leaders’ attacks on the PKI were not confined to the question of 
religion, however. Having convinced the Indonesian public of the dangers of the 
Soviet system, Masyumi went on to explain why it appealed to the PKI. The Muslim 
party needed to show that behind the old tune which the Indonesian communists 
banged out about offering an original path for their country to follow, the face of 
totalitarianism lurked menacingly. One of the most commonly used arguments was to 
refer to the portraits of international communist figures which could be seen at PKI 
rallies. Concerning threats made against Masyumi, the party’s press often 
incriminated the communists whenever its members were beaten up by unknown 
individuals (Madinier, 2015, 152). 
There were several reasons as to why the election could only be held in 1955. The 
nation had been preoccupied with defending and consolidating its territorial integrity 
in the years following the proclamation of independence. The lack of legal basis for 
election and bureaucratic inefficiency also proved to be a major obstacle. 
 
Method 
This research uses historical method through which past events are analyzed and 
evaluated. The method is further divided into four steps: heuristics, source analysis, 
interpretation, and historiography. This research uses Masyumi’s official documents, 
which include the party’s articles of association, party regulations, programs, profiles 
and various decrees issued by the party. Other sources include articles from Masyumi 
newspapers, periodicals and magazines, mainly Abadi newpaper, Hikmah magazine, 
and Berita Masjumi owned by Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia in Jakarta. 
Additional sources are also obtained from Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, KPU 
(General Elections Commission) Pusat and several institutions run by ex-Masyumi 
members. Secondary sources and references include books, journals and scholarly 
articles from private collection, Universitas Diponegoro library, Universitas Indonesia 
library and Perpustakaan Nasional. 
The sources were then classified, verified and analyzed in preparation for the last 
step, which is historiography. Historiography includes all bodies of historical work, be 
it undergrad/graduate theses, dissertations or historical books. 
 
Partai Masyumi in 1955 General Election 
Mass media played a key role as a political instrument in the years leading up to the 
election. At the time, every party had their own publications; PNI with their daily 
Suluh Indonesia Muda, Partai Sosialis had Pedoman, NU had Duta Masjarakat, the 
Communist Party had Harian Rakjat and Masyumi had Abadi. Partindo even owned 
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three newspapers: Pemandangan, Merdeka and Bintang Timur. The were also Sin Po for 
left-leaning Chinese and Keng Po for the non-leftists (Hamad, 2004, p. 72). 
Naturally, these newspapers promoted and propagated ideologies of the parties 
they were associated with. The newspapers also became a medium in which ideas and 
party programs were put forward and proselytized. Political jabs aimed at rivals was 
a common occurence in newspapers of the time, since ideological polarization had 
reached an alltime high. Therefore the proliferation of newspapers at the time can not 
be simply explained with economic rationale. Ideas and discourse can be easily 
communicated and propagated to a wider audience through mass media, and political 
power no longer rested in the hands of political parties, but also to those who owned 
the means to sway public opinions. 
Masyumi’s leadership recognized the power of mass media as an instrument to 
propagate the party’s political platforms and programs. In one of his books Daniel 
Dakhidae postulated that newspapers serve as a middlemen between capital and 
power. While processing information and texts, the newspapers also turn themselves 
into texts, and in other time into capital and eventually power (Dakhidae, 2003, p. 361). 
Masyumi distinguished themselves from other parties by having the highest number 
of official and affiliated newspapers. These official or Masyumi-affiliated newspapers 
were: Abadi, Suara Masjumi, Berita Masjumi, and Hikmah weekly. Berita Masjumi was 
published by the Central Committee’s Department of Information and only internally 
circulated, while Abadi and Hikmah were aimed for wider readership and managed 
mostly by symphatizers or affiliated groups. 
For the 1955 campaign in Jakarta Masyumi had big names like Sukiman, M. 
Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap and M. Roem as their campaign spokepersons and 
strategists. It was no surprise that Masyumi relied heavily on mass meetings and put 
their renowned list of campaign speakers into good use. Their targets were as clear as 
day: Jakartan muslims. 
 
Masyumi Against Its Rivals 
In the 1955 election Masyumi contested against the other three big parties: PNI, NU 
and PKI. NU finished third and this came as a surprise to a lot of people. The 
nationwide results for the three parties are as follows: PNI won the election with 
8,434,653 or 22.3% votes, Masyumi came second with 7,903,886 or 20.9% votes and NU 
in third with 6,955,141 or 18.4% votes (Feith, 1999, p. 37). 
Table 1 indicates that having just split up from Masyumi, NU’s results came as a 
shock. For a party that was considered as an inexperienced splinter group of Masyumi, 
their performance in the election exceeded all expectations. Only 43,104,464 out of 
77,987,979 people were eligible with only 37,787,569 valid ballots for the first phase. 
The big four represented the three dominant socio-political classes of the time, which 
is abangan for PKI, santri for Masyumi and NU and priyayi for PNI. 
Rivalry between Masyumi and PKI was perhaps the fiercest among others due 
to their ideological incompatibility. Harian Rakjat’s headlines often took a jab at 
Masyumi and Masyumi’s newspapers did the same in retaliation. One example was 
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the “Masjumi memalsu Ronggowarsito” headline by Harian Rakjat that accused 
Masyumi of plagiaring Ronggowarsito’s works and in return Abadi made “Provokasi 
baru” to counter Harian Rakjat’s accusation. Provocative banters were also common 
during campaign, one example involves one PKI speaker who jokingly stated during 
a speech that Lapangan Banteng (Ind. Bull’s Field, a public field in Jakarta) will be 
renamed Lapangan Onta (Camel’s Field) if Masyumi ever won the election, and 
Masyumi stated that the aforementioned field will be renamed Lapangan Beruang 
(Bear’s Field, after PKI’s ideological ties to Moscow) (Kompas, 27 Agustus 1997). 
 
Table 1. The Big Four in 1955 Election 
No. Parties Vote Count % Seats 
1 Indonesian National 
Party (PNI) 
8.434.653 22,3 57 
2 Masyumi Party 7.903.886 20,9 57 
3 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 6.955.141 18,4 45 
4 Communist Party of 
Indonesia (PKI) 
6.176.914 16,4 39 
Source: Feith (1999). 
 
While Masyumi clerics brought party propaganda into their Friday prayer 
speeches, PKI embraced traditional folk theater as their medium for propaganda. In 
Central Java, Lekra-affiliated Bakoksi (Badan Koordinasi Ketoprak Seluruh Indonesia/All-
Indonesian Ketoprak Coordinating Board) went town to town performing plays with 
provocative titles such as “Matine Gusti Allah” (The Death of God), “Gusti Allah 
Manten” (God’s Wedding), Malaikat Kimpoi (When Angels Mate) and “Gusti Allah 
Ngunduh Mantu” (God’s Son-in-Law). Christians also became a target of this mockery 
through a play titled “Paus Rabi” (Pope’s Wedding) (Said, 2018, p. 42) 
Through Hikmah’s Kawan dan Lawan column Masyumi urged their readers to 
take a precautions and observe the way communist parties rose to power in Russia, 
Poland and Romania (Hikmah, 1 Januari 1955). The party through its Central 
Consultative Assembly went even further by issuing a decree titled “Communism in 
Islamic Law” during the party’s 7th conference on 23‒27 December 1954 which 
proclaimed that communism was incompatible with Islamic values and the 
communists could therefore be considered as infidels (kufr). This shows just how 
extreme and militant both sides were ideologically. 
As I have stated previously, Masyumi finished second behind PNI. Though the 
result cemented PNI’s and Masyumi’s place in the national politics, neither were 
ecstatic with the result. At the same time the result saw the emergence of NU and PKI 
as strong contenders to the status quo. Each PNI and Masyumi could only secure 57 
out of 257 seats, while NU and PKI saw an increase in their alloted seats, with 45 and 
39 seats respectively (before the election both parties only had 8 and 17 seats in the 
Provisional Assembly). Masyumi previously boasted that they had around 40 millions 
members and symphatizers, so they had all the reasons to be disappointed with the 
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outcome (Maarif, 1996, p. 122). If we split the result into ideological lines, the Islamic 
parties (Masyumi, NU, and other Islamic parties) won 45.2% of the votes (116 out of 
257 seats), while the Nationalist parties came second with 27.6% (71 out of 257 seats) 
and the communist/Marxist parties finished third with 15.2% (39 out of 257 seats). The 
remaining seats were divided among smaller socialist or leftist parties. 
The rift between Masyumi and the nationalists over forms of government in the 
early days of the republic was reignited when Mei Kartawinata, member of Persatuan 
Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia/Permai (Indonesian Marhaen People’s Union) issued a 
blasphemous statement that accused Muhammad as a false prophet (Feith, 2007, p. 
350). As a result, around 500,000 Betawi muslims took to the street in protest over the 
statement. A PNI member named Hardi also caused a stir when he stated that the 
Quran was obsolescent (Schroder, 2003). 
In response to the statements made by Permai and PNI members, Masyumi and 
other Islamic organizations launched a mass protest in February 1954. In reality, this 
protest can be considered as a continuation of the previous protest over the 
replacement of Masyumi-backed mayor with Sudiro, who was a PNI member. This 
precedent changed the composition of the Election Committee just a year before the 
election was about to be held, which put Masyumi at a disadvantage. The protest was 
also aimed at the government’s inaction regarding the blasphemy case. 
 
Masyumi’s Campaign Strategies in Jakarta 
According to Feith (2007, p. 23) several campaign issues that had been proven to be 
succesful in galvanizing support in the countryside could not be utilized by Masyumi 
in Jakarta due to the city’s moral climate. Therefore in Jakarta, Masyumi’s campaign 
revolved around Islamic solidarity (ukhuwah islamiyah) instead of factionalism.  
The 1955 election result in Jakarta put Masyumi as the winner. An open meeting 
was held at Taman W. R. Supratman on 23 October 1955 to determine the winner for 
the six allocated seats in the DPR (People’s Representative Council) from Jakarta 
region. Of all participants, Masyumi and PNI were the only parties that secured the 
guaranteed one seat since their vote tallies exceeded the vote threshold. According to 
Jakarta Regional Election Committee, out of the total 791,046 ballots, the number of 
valid ballots was 766,764 and the invalids 24,282. Based on the result, the committee 
agreed to determine the threshold by dividing the number of valid ballots by six, 
which is 127,794 votes per seat (Merdeka, 24 October 1955). 
 
Masyumi won in the Jakarta region with 174,043 votes and the result proved that 
the party had a significant amount of support in Jakarta. Their victory can be attributed 
to effective campaign strategies and the support of Muhammadiyah members. The 
election in Jakarta went relatively smoothly. 
The first strategy employed by Masyumi was to maximize the role of their media 
outlets. There was a trend even long before the election in which party-affiliated 
newspaper to start opinion wars between themselves. This mostly resulted from their 
supposedly irreconcilable ideological and political differences. The quarrel between 
IHiS (Indonesian Historical Studies), 3 (2), 32-42 © 2020 | E-ISSN: 2579-4213 
Masyumi’s Campaign Strategies in the 1955 Election in Jakarta            | 40  
 
Abadi and Harian Rakjat really started in 1952 when an article in Harian Rakjat accused 
Masyumi of being pro-nekolim (neo-colonialist) and pro-Western after the under-the-
table signing of the Mutual Security Act by Prime Minister Sukiman, which received 
widespread condemnation and criticism (Abadi, 2 February 1952). Abadi returned the 
favor by issuing an article which likens PKI, who were very vocal about land-reform 
issues, to the Bolsheviks before the 1917 Revolution. Abadi’s anti-PKI rhetorics reflected 
Masyumi’s fervent anti-communist attitude and most of their anti-PKI communist 
propaganda was about discrediting communism. And this hostile exchanges had a 
polarizing effect that made supporters from both parties more militant. 
From the outcome of the election we can infer that partisan media outlets had 
had a huge role in Masyumi’s campaign. And this was probably a strategy that 
Masyumi was forced to take since Masyumi had lost lots of their support base after the 
split of NU and PSII from Masyumi’s rank. Masyumi’s other strategies involves 
cooperating with Muhammadiyah in their community outreach programs, e.g. 
healthcare, communal recitation and religious education (Hefner, 1997, p. 81). The 
party also focused their campaign in the form of mass meetings, from branch to 
national level. In these meetings Masyumi’s big names from Jakarta like Sukiman and 
Natsir would give speeches. In this case having big names on their side became 
Masyumi’s big advantage. 
During the canvassing phase Masyumi cadres would go door to door promoting 
Masyumi’s programs, slogans and logo through pamphlets and posters, sometimes 
even forums where people could inform their needs and grievances. In this meetings, 
Masyumi members and speakers would also stressed Masyumi’s involvement in the 
independence movement along with other muslim clerics. Masyumi had a rather 
unconfrontational attitude towards other Islamic parties because there was an 
unwritten agreement in place to uphold the sense of muslim solidarity (ukhuwah 
islamiyyah) and to keep these parties from being invovled in a political quarrel. 
The result of the 1955 election gave Masyumi much needed legal-parliamentarian 
basis for the pursue of their political and ideological goals. In support of this, 
Masyumi’s Central Consultative Assembly issued a fatwa regarding the election, 
which stated that it was mandatory for every muslims to be involved in the effort to 
constitute a parliament and the Constitutional Assembly (Samsuri, 2004, p. 76). 
 
Conclusion 
From the study, it can be inferred that Partai Masyumi and their rivals relied heavily 
on their news outlets during their campaign, both to spread their political programs 
and to inform the public about their agendas and platforms. In this front, Masyumi 
outcompeted their rivals through sheer number. Masyumi’s news outlets consisted of 
Abadi, Berita Masyumi, Hikmah, Suara Partai Masyumi and Suara Masyumi. The 
number of news outlets employed by rivals such as PNI were much smaller in number, 
in this case PNI only had Persatuan Indonesia and Banteng. However, their 
effectiveness made up for their small number.  
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All in all, the 1955 election was a lively one. Every party made use of their 
well-known cadres and members in their campaigns to gain votes. In Jakarta Masyumi 
members went from neighborhood to neighborhood on their canvassing effort to gain 
grassroot votes. The party, just like other parties also held mass rallies and meetings. 
During the campaign phase, clashes between rivaling parties (Masyumi, PNI, NU and 
PKI) were common; inflammatory slogans and songs reflected the animosities 
between these parties. Masyumi’s mass media campaign and door-to-door approach 
proved to be the keys to their success in Jakarta. 
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